This paper examines how the absorption of talent into the financial sector affects the real sectors in the economy. Based on a sample of 13 countries observed over the period 1980-2005, I show that financial liberalization is associated with skillupgrading in the financial sector. I exploit variation in financial liberalization across countries and time, and differences in the needs for skilled labour across manufacturing industries to identify the effect of the absorption of talent into finance on real sector outcomes. My evidence suggests that employment of skilled individuals grows disproportionally slower in skill-intensive relative to less skill-intensive industries following financial reform. I also show that financial liberalization decreases labour productivity, total factor productivity and value added growth disproportionally in industries which rely strongly on skilled labour. This is consistent with the idea that financial liberalization hurts non-financial sectors via a brain-drain effect. Among the different dimensions of financial liberalization, especially policies fostering the development of security markets account for this finding.
Introduction
Government bailouts in the wake of the financial crisis sparked public outrage over the extraordinary compensation packages received by financial sector employees. In many advanced countries, compensation in the financial sector has been rising since the 1980s and peaked around the crisis time. This development has been accompanied by an upward trend in the skill-intensity of the financial sector. Although the evolution of the salaries and the skillintensity of the financial sector have attracted the attention of academics, regulators and politicians, the implications of the absorption of skilled individuals into the financial sector for the real economy have not been assessed so far. Improving our understanding of how the attraction of talent by the financial industry affects real sectors is vital in light of both, the scale and speed of the ascendancy of finance and the finding by recent studies that rents have emerged in the financial industry. The latter suggests that too much talent might flow into the financial sector relative to the social optimum. This could lead to inefficiently low levels of productivity and growth in real sectors. This paper examines how the flow of talent into the financial sector affects productivity and growth of manufacturing sectors. To identify the effect of a diversion of skilled labour into finance I exploit variation in the timing and extent of financial liberalization across 13 mostly European countries over the period from 1980 to 2005.
Philippon and Reshef show that financial liberalization is a key determinant of the skillintensity of the financial sector in the U.S. (Philippon and Reshef, forthcoming) and other countries (Philippon and Reshef, 2013) . This result also holds for my sample and might be due to the fact that financial liberalization allows skilled labour to engage in more creative and complex activities, and to operate on a larger scale. To identify the absorption of skilled labour as the channel through which financial liberalization affects the real economy, I test for a differential effect of financial reform across manufacturing sectors with different dependencies on skilled labour. A diversion of talent into finance should disproportionally affect those real sectors which are very R&D-or skill-intensive.
The theoretical prediction of a heterogeneous response across real sectors with different skill-intensities is derived from a model by Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny (1991) .
The authors model a situation where two sectors compete for talent. In their setup, individuals with high ability organize production whereas individuals with lower ability become workers.
Both sectors exhibit increasing returns to ability and talented individuals choose the sector where attractive compensation contracts, large markets, and weak diminishing returns to scale allow them to earn the highest returns on their skills. An interesting feature of the model is that individuals with similar ability cluster in the same sector. This leads to inefficiencies in any scenario where the ability of individuals working in a sector drives productivity and hence growth in that sector. An increase in the relative attractiveness of one of the sectors, for instance due to changes in regulations, induces the most able individuals to switch to this sector. As a result, productivity and income in the other sector declines.
To understand how this model can be applied to my setup, assume that there is a financial sector, a high-skill sector and a low-skill sector. An increase in the relative attractiveness of finance affects only the productivity and the skill-level of the high-skill sector if the financial sector initially attracts the group of individuals with a level of ability just below that of the high-skill sector. A change in financial regulation may then induce individuals to switch between the financial and the high-skill sector while individuals in lowskilled sectors remain in their sector. Due to a decrease in the ability of individuals working in the high-skill sector, the performance of this sector deteriorates.
Detailed data on the skill-structure of sectors from the KLEMS EU database allow me to test for changes in the skill-intensity of different sectors in response to financial reform. My analysis first confirms that financial deregulation is a robust determinant of the skill-intensity My results indicate that among the different reforms to liberalize the financial sector, especially policies encouraging the development of security markets are responsible for this finding.
Previous research has shown that financial liberalization leads to more liquid stock markets (Levine and Zervos, 1998) , reductions in the cost of capital (Charis and Henry, 2002) , a relaxation of capital constraints (Lins, Strickland and Zenner (2003) , Gelos and Werner (2002) , Gupta and Yuan (2009), and Laeven (2003) ) and improvements in the efficiency of capital allocation (Galindo et al. (2007) and Abiad et al. (2008) ). R&D-intensive industries tend to rely more on external funds and are therefore relatively more affected by changes in credit market conditions following financial reform. Hence, it is essential to separate effects operating through changes in capital markets from a brain-drain effect by including a control term for the former. In line with existing evidence, I find that financial liberalization improves productivity and growth relatively more in industries which rely a lot on external funds. Improvements in credit market conditions following financial reform could be due to a rise in the skill-level in financial institutions. More skilled employees might be better at allocating funds to productive projects or monitor firms better. Thus, my control term might to some extent capture the gains for real sectors from a diversion of talent into finance.
My results indicate however that for the vast majority of manufacturing industries, the negative brain-drain effect of financial liberalization dominates the positive effect which operates through improvements in credit markets. This suggests that the net effect of the attraction of talent by the financial sector is negative for manufacturing sectors.
One potential concern with my methodology is that the decision to liberalize might be endogenous. It is for instance conceivable that policymakers deregulate the financial sector in response to a disappointing growth performance of some of the real sectors. Such concerns are mitigated by the fact that my sample consists mostly of EU countries and countries which joined the EU during the sample period. In these countries, many reforms to financial sector regulation were implemented in response to EU directives and legislation, or in fulfillment of the accession criteria. The timing and extent of financial sector reforms is therefore not directly linked to national economic developments. To rule out that financial reform was a response to the decline of R&D-intensive industries, I also check whether the degree of financial liberalization was associated with changes in the relative performance of high and low-R&D industries prior to the introduction of financial sector reforms. The absence of a significant relationship between financial reform and prior industry performance confirms that the European context is suitable for assessing whether the diversion of talent into finance affects real sector outcomes. Another advantage of focusing on European countries is that, owing to language barriers, labour mobility is relatively low. This limits the extent to which migration of skilled labour between countries could distort my analysis.
Assessing the consequences of a diversion of skilled labour into the financial sector and away from real sectors is particularly relevant in light of the on-going debate over a potential wedge between private and social returns to financial activities. A large theoretical and empirical literature has established that the financial sector provides many valuable and essential services to the real economy (see Levine (2005) for a summary). As intermediaries between users and providers of funds, financial institutions play a key role in driving economic growth by allocating capital to its highest value use. However, in the aftermath of the crisis the social value of some financial sector activities has been questioned and financiers have been accused of rent-seeking. argues for example that "everything we know suggests that the rapid growth in finance since 1980 has largely been a matter of rent-seeking, rather than true productivity". The possibility that the financial sector engages in rent-seeking rather than delivering economic value has also been emphasized by Lord Turner, until recently Chairman of the Financial Service Authority (Turner, 2010) .
Similarly, Paul Woolley states that "Rent extraction has become one of the defining features of finance and goes a long way to explaining the sector's extraordinary growth in recent years, as well as its fragility and potential for crisis." (Woolley, 2010) .
It has been argued that compensation of financial sector employees has been based on transitory short-term profits which were not adjusted for risks. Bonuses were thus derived from temporary value created which evaporated later on. Haldane, Brennan and Madouros (2010) conclude that "Risk illusion, rather than a productivity miracle, appears to have driven high returns to finance. " They argue that excess returns had been generated based on leverage, larger trading books, and the sale of tail risk insurance on complex, opaque and risky products. The Financial Services Authority (2009) highlights that much of the structuring and trading activity involved in the complex credit securitization was not necessary to achieve efficient credit intermediation but was designed to extract rents based on the opacity of margins and asymmetric information between the users and the producers of financial services. Crotty (2010) notes that economies of scale and scope constitute barriers to entry in some segments of the financial service industry such as investment banking, and that this market power contributes to excessive compensation. Chen and Ritter (2000) present for instance evidence that collusion led to underwriting fees above competitive levels.
A number of empirical studies document that there are compensation premiums to working in finance and provide evidence suggesting that these premiums are rents rather than returns to skills. Philippon and Reshef (forthcoming) find that in the decade prior to the financial crisis, rents accounted for 30% to 50% of the wage differential between the financial sector and non-financial sectors in the U.S.. Using data from Harvard and Radcliffe College graduates and controlling for a large amount of individual characteristics, Goldin and Katz (2008) show that graduates working in finance enjoy an earnings premium of 195% over other occupations. Comparing cohorts from 1970 and 1990, they also document that the share of those working in financial services increased dramatically. Oyer (2008) studies career paths
of Stanford MBA students and shows that investment bankers are "made by circumstance" rather than being "born to work in Wall Street". He estimates wage differences between entry-level investment bankers and MBAs who enter consultancy of around 64%. The wage difference between investment bankers in their first year and graduates who become entrepreneurs exceeds 170%. These differences increase when wages are compared for years longer after graduation. Oyer argues that these differentials do not simply reflect a skill premium. Célérier (2011) shows that the premium for French engineers to working in finance was 7% in the 1980s and 30% in the 2000s. In line with these findings, the representation of individuals working in finance in the top brackets of the income distribution has increased in the UK (Bell and van Reenen, 2013) , the US (Kaplan and Rauh, 2010) and France (Godechot, 2011) .
If rents are collected in the financial sector then this implies that too much talent flows into finance relative to the social optimum. This in turn results in an inefficient allocation of skilled labour between the financial and the real sectors, thus hampering productivity and growth. The debate about the ascendancy of finance and changes to the skill-and compensation patterns in this sector has mostly ignored such consequences for real sectors.
Recent studies documenting that financial sectors can grow excessively large mention the misallocation of labour across sectors as a potential contributing factor but do not explore this channel empirically (Arcand, Berkes and Panizza (2011); Cecchetti and Kharroubi, (2012) ).
To my knowledge, the vast literature on the growth effects of financial liberalization and the channels through which financial reforms affects the real economy has not focused on allocation of labour between sectors either (see Kose et al. (2007) and Henry (2007) for an overview of this literature). This paper is a first attempt to fill this gap.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The next section discusses the estimation methodology. Section 3 introduces the dataset. The results are presented in section 4. Section 5 shows robustness tests and section 6 concludes.
Empirical Strategy
Due to endogeneity concerns it is not possible to identify the effect of a diversion of talent into finance by regressing the number of skilled people in finance on productivity and growth in real sectors. A negative relationship between these variables would also be consistent with causality running from real sector performance to skill-structures in finance.
In particular, it is conceivable that a decline in productivity and hence wages in real sectors induce skilled labour to switch to jobs in finance. Skilled individuals in the financial sector and productivity in real sectors could also be jointly determined by factors that are difficult to control for. Technological change is an example of this. To circumvent these problems I exploit variation in financial liberalization across countries and years to determine how skilled labour in the financial sector affects productivity and growth in the real sectors of the economy. Following the methodological approach of Rajan and Zingales (1998) , I also exploit heterogeneity across industries in terms of their needs for skilled labour. Sectors which rely heavily on skilled labour should be relatively more affected by a drag of skilled labour into the financial services industry. A negative β-coefficient indicates that R&D-intensive industries which depend strongly on skilled labour suffer disproportionally from the attraction of talent into the financial sector.
The interaction term between the external financial dependence of an industry and the financial liberalization index controls for the possibility that financial liberalization might lead to changes in the quantity and cost of credit, and the efficiency of credit allocation. This in turn could have a heterogeneous effect on productivity and growth structures across different industries. 1 The effect of industries which depend more on external funds should be relatively more affected by changes in credit conditions following deregulation. Since industries that rely more on external funds also tend to be more R&D-intensive it is essential to separate effects operating through changes in credit markets from a brain-drain effect. If financial deregulation is associated with a relaxation of credit constraints and a more efficient allocation of capital then especially productivity and growth in industries which are dependent on external funds should improve. This would be reflected in a positive γ-coefficient. Note that changes in credit conditions might partially be attributable to more skilled labour working in financial occupations. Thus, the interaction between external dependence and financial liberalization also encompasses a potentially positive effect of the attraction of talent into the financial sector working through an improvement of financial services.
Data
Financial liberalization. I use the index provided by Abiad, Detragiache and Tressel (2008) to gauge the degree of financial liberalization in a country and year. The financial Compustat. These industry characteristics are supposed to capture an industry's intrinsic or technological need for external funding and R&D activity. Since Compustat firms are large and well-established and since they have access to security markets, they are likely to be relatively unconstrained in their use of external funds and skilled employees. Thus, their use of these factors should approximate demand. I calculate these industry characteristics using data for the 1980s. It has been argued that in the 1980s, the financial system in the US was already sufficiently well developed to serve the financial needs of the real sectors (e.g. ). Furthermore, the US financial sector in the 1980s was relatively small compared to later decades, suggesting that the competition for human resources from the financial sector was relatively limited at the time. Thus, data from the 1980s provide a good approximation of industries' demand for external funds and skilled employees.
Following Rajan and Zingales (1998) , I assume that sectoral technological differences for the U.S. persist across countries. I exclude the U.S. from my sample in order to avoid potential endogeneity problems associated with the fact that my industry characteristics were calculated on the basis of US data. My analysis encompasses all manufacturing industries.
These 13 industries are categorized according to the European Nace revision 1 classification. -1990s. 4 Given that changes to some of the components of the liberalization index such as the reforms to security market regulation were confined to the 1980s in most countries I choose 1980 as the starting date for the sample. My sample ends in 2005, the last year for which the financial liberalization index is available.
The KLEMS database contains various productivity indicators which are generated from growth accounting. Value added growth is broken down into the contributions of hours worked, changes in labour composition, ICT capital services, non-ICT capital services and total factor productivity (see Mahony and Timmer (2009) for more details). I use the contribution of total factor productivity to value added growth and the contribution of labour productivity to value added growth, which is defined as value added growth minus the contribution of hours worked, as dependent variables. Furthermore, I use the contribution of the knowledge economy to value added growth which is the sum of the growth contributions from investment in ICT capital, labour composition in terms of gender and skill, and total factor productivity. I also examine the effect of the absorption of highly skilled labour into finance on the growth rate of gross value added per hour worked and the growth rate of real value added.
The KLEMS database also offers a number of employment indicators disaggregated by the skill-level of persons working in an industry. I use the share of hours worked by high skilled persons in an industry (skill-intensity) and the total number of hours worked by skilled individuals in an industry (skilled hours) as dependent variables. Since education levels have risen over time and skill-levels in the economy improved more generally, I also consider the ratio of the skill-intensity of a sector relative to the entire economy (relative skill-intensity) and the number of "skilled hours" in a sector relative to the total economy (relative skilled hours). High skilled persons are defined as persons with at least a bachelor degree or equivalent. Table 3 
The Effect of the Absorption of Talent into Finance on Skill Structures in Real Sectors
This section presents results from estimating equation (1) 
Productivity and Growth Effects of the Absorption of Talent into Finance
To test how the diversion of talent into finance and away from non-financial sectors affects real sector performance I estimate equation (1) (5) and (6) show that financial deregulation is also associated with a disproportional decrease in the contribution of the knowledge economy to value added growth in R&D-intensive sectors.
These negative effects on the sources of value added growth combine to a negative overall effect on the growth rate of value added per hour worked and total value added growth as the results in the last four columns of table 6 indicate.
Accounting for changes in capital markets by including an interaction term between external finance dependence and the liberalization index increases the size of the negative effect of talent absorption on my outcome variables. The positive coefficients on the control variable are significant except in the specification with the growth rate of value added per hour worked as the dependent variable. This finding is in line with existing evidence showing that financial liberalization leads to more liquid stock markets (Levine and Zervos, 1998) , reductions in the cost of capital (Charis and Henry, 2002) , a relaxation of capital constraints (Lins, Strickland and Zenner (2003) , Gelos and Werner (2002) , Gupta and Yuan (2009), and Laeven (2003) ) and improvements in the efficiency of capital allocation (Galindo et al. (2007) and Abiad et al. (2008) ). These improvements which might partially be attributable to a more skilled labour force in finance seem to translate into productivity and growth gains especially for those sectors which rely strongly on external funds.
To interpret the coefficients in table 6 
Decomposition of the Effect of Financial Liberalization
To test which specific reforms drive the diversion of talent into finance, I also estimate equation (1) table 7 is sensitive to the inclusion of control terms which might aggravate multicollinearity problems. The results for the specifications without the control terms suggest that the disproportional slowdown in productivity and value added growth in R&D-intensive industries is mainly driven by policies encouraging the development of security markets. For some of the other components the coefficients are consistently negative but never significant.
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The finding of a brain-drain effect associated with policies encouraging the development of security markets is in line with expectations. The growth of security markets entailed the creation of high wage/high skill jobs in asset management, trading, and brokerdealer activities which attracted talent to the financial industry. Especially traders have been among the top earners of the industry. It has been argued that performance-based bonuses gave traders an incentive to take on excessive risks and proposals for regulating their pay 8 The standard errors for the interaction terms with the privatization component in table 7 are missing. Standard errors clustered by industry and country have been generated using the command provided by Mitchell Petersen which implements the estimation procedure described in Cameron, Gelbach and Miller (2011) . Since the command involves subtracting off the variance matrix clustered by industry-country, standard errors might be missing due to negative values.
were made in the aftermath of the crisis.
Robustness
The two most important challenges for identification in my setup are the potential endogeneity of the decision to liberalize the financial sector, and the possibility that other reforms were introduced concurrently with financial liberalization. I address each of these in turn. Furthermore, this section tests whether results differ across subsets of countries with differing risk-taking propensities for financial institutions.
Exogeneity
A concern with my estimation methodology is that financial liberalization might be endogenous in my setup. The decision of a country to liberalize its financial sector could be driven by the evolution of its industrial structure over time and by the emergence of growth opportunities for a particular set of industries. Financial reform could also be the result of lobbying efforts by different real sectors. Thus, my specification could suffer from reverse causality. This argument does not apply to Japan and Australia, the two non-EU countries in my sample. Furthermore, large or wealthy EU countries had more influence in shaping EU regulations, and might have used this political power to pursue national growth strategies.
There is no obvious way of sorting EU countries according to their political power -not least because the power structure changed over time. Arguably, Germany stands out as a political leader throughout my sample period. I therefore re-estimate my productivity and growth regressions without Australia, Germany and Japan. The evidence presented in table 8 confirms that my results also hold for the subsample of countries where the liberalization process was more likely driven by exogenous forces.
A negative coefficient on the main interaction term is only reconcilable with causality running from real sector performance to financial reform if R&D-intensive industries were expected to perform worse than other industries in the years prior to reforms or if, possibly due to a loss in competitiveness, R&D-intensive industries had less influence in shaping the political process. To test whether reverse causality is a concern I examine the relationship between the degree of financial liberalization in a country and the relative strength of a country's high and low R&D industries in the year prior to a major change in a country's liberalization index. Industries with an R&D-intensity above the median in my sample are classified as high R&D industries and industries with an R&D-intensity below the median are classified as low R&D industries. I divide the average performance of high R&D industries by that of low R&D industries for each of my outcome variables in the year prior to a change in the financial index and correlate the ratios with the change in the financial index. 10 The absence of a significant correlation between any of the performance ratios and the change in financial reform suggests that financial reforms were not introduced to accommodate less R&D-intensive industries with large growth potential or strong bargaining power.
Furthermore, there is no relationship between the R&D-intensity of an industry and any of my outcome variables from equation (1) prior to regulatory changes. If causality ran from industry performance or political strength to financial reform we should observe a negative relationship between these variables.
Controlling for Other Economic Reforms and for Financial Sector Size
This section addresses the concern that measures to liberalize the financial sector might have coincided with other structural reforms which also had a differential effect across (4) and (5) of table 9. While the coefficients on the interaction terms between the industry characteristics and financial sector size are not significant the original finding of a brain-drain effect continues to hold.
Government Support and Risk-Taking by Financial Institutions
The financial sector is a particularly attractive career choice for talent if rewards that can be earned in this sector are large. It is likely that government support of banks interacts with policies to liberalize the financial sector in determining the returns for talented individuals in finance. Government support may exacerbate morale hazard problems and lead banks to take on risks which boost the compensation of employees. We should therefore observe that the effect of the diversion of talent into the financial sector following financial reform is stronger in countries with extensive safety nets for financial institutions.
Most empirical studies on the link between government support and bank risk-taking come to the conclusion that public guarantees increase the risk-taking behaviour of banks. It has been shown that risk-taking by banks increases in the presence of explicit government guarantees such as deposit insurance schemes (e.g. Chernykh and Cole (2011), Ioannidou and Penas (2010) , Hovakimian, Kane and Laeven (2003) , Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (2002)). There is also evidence suggesting that banks which are large or perceived as being too big to fail adopt riskier strategies (e.g. Boyd and Runkle (1993) , Boyd and Gertler (1994) , Schnabel (2004 Schnabel ( , 2009 ). Gropp, Hakenes and Schnabel (2011) construct a measure of the extent of public guarantees for banks which encompasses both explicit and implicit 13 These results are available on request.
government guarantees using rating information from Fitch/IBCA. The authors obtain "bailout-probabilities" of individual banks by gauging the difference between banks' Individual Rating, a rating which ignores the possibility of government support, and the Issuer Rating, a rating which takes into account external support. Based on these bailout probabilities the authors calculate the market share of insured banks for individual countries.
Higher values of this share can be due to a large share of publicly owned banks or due to the existence of explicit or implicit government guarantees. For my sample of countries public ownership of banks and the share of insured banks are not correlated, suggesting that differences across countries are mainly driven by differences in government guarantees. 
Conclusion
This paper has examined whether the absorption of talent into the financial sector affects the performance of real sectors. To identify this effect I have exploited variations in liberalization patters across countries and time and heterogeneous responses of manufacturing sectors with different skill-intensities. I show that liberalization was associated with an increase in the skill-intensity of the financial sector. This diversion of talent into the financial sector is reflected in changes in the skill-structure of real sectors: I show that the skillintensity of industries which are very R&D-intensive grows relatively slower following liberalization. My results suggest that this comes at the cost of productivity and growth in real sectors. I find that financial liberalization disproportionally reduces labour productivity, total factor productivity and value added growth in skill-or R&D-intensive industries. This brain-drain effect is counterbalanced by effects working through changes in credit markets. I show that financial liberalization disproportionally increases productivity and growth in industries which rely heavily on external funds. The combined effect thus depends on an industry's relative reliance on external funds and skilled labour. My findings indicate that the combined effect of financial liberalization is only positive for two of the 13 manufacturing industries. Thus, even if the finding of disproportional improvements in the performance of industries which rely heavily on external funds was entirely due to skillupgrading in financial institutions, the brain-drain effect associated with a diversion of talent dominates for the majority of manufacturing sectors. In order to draw conclusion about the welfare impact of the talent absorption into finance for individual countries it would however be necessary to take into account possible effects on the performance of non-manufacturing sectors and the financial sector itself.
My analysis draws attention to the fact that financial liberalization was associated with an attraction of talent into the financial sector which had severe ramifications for the most innovative real sectors in the economy. Combined with the finding of rents in finance by earlier research, my evidence suggests that the new profit or rent-seeking opportunities that arise from financial liberalization necessitate a revision of compensation arrangements to ensure an efficient allocation of talent between the financial and the real sectors of the economy. Table 2 Industry characteristics: R&D-intensities and external finance dependence
APPENDIX
The industry characteristics are calculated using Compustat data from 1980 to 1989. The R&D-intensity of an industry is defined as the median ratio of R&D-expenses over assets. The external finance dependence of an industry is defined as the median ratio of capital expenditures minus cash flows from operations divided by capital expenditures. (skill-intensity) , the share of hours worked by skilled persons in an industry relative to the total economy (relative skill-intensity), the number of hours worked by skilled individuals in an industry (skilled hours) and the number of hours worked by skilled individuals in an industry relative to the total economy (relative skilled hours). R&D-intensity and external finance dependence are industry characteristics which are interacted with the financial liberalization index for a country and year (Liberalization). Industry size is the value added share of an industry. I include industry-year fixed effects and country-year fixed effects. The standard errors in parenthesis are clustered by country and industry. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1% level.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (1) for 13 countries over the period 1980-2005. The dependent variables are the contribution of labour productivity, TFP and the knowledge economy to value added growth, and the growth rates of value added per hour worked and value added. R&D-intensity and external finance dependence are industry characteristics which are interacted with the financial liberalization index for a country and year (Liberalization). Industry size is the employment share of an industry. I include industry-year fixed effects and country-year fixed effects. The standard errors in parenthesis are clustered by country and industry. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1% level.
(1) (1) with each of the seven components of the financial liberalization index instead of the combined index for 13 countries over the period 1980-2005. The dependent variables are the contribution of labour productivity, TFP and the knowledge economy to value added growth, and the growth rates of value added per hour worked and value added. R&D-intensity and external finance dependence are industry characteristics which are interacted with each of the 7 components of the financial liberalization index for a country and year (Finlib_comp1-7). Industry size is the employment share of an industry. I include industry-year fixed effects and country-year fixed effects. The standard errors in parenthesis are clustered by country and industry. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1% level.
(1) (1) for the period 1980-2005. Australia, Japan and Germany are excluded from the sample. The dependent variables are the contribution of labour productivity, TFP and the knowledge economy to value added growth, and the growth rates of value added per hour worked and value added. R&D-intensity and external finance dependence are industry characteristics which are interacted with the financial liberalization index for a country and year (Liberalization). Industry size is the employment share of an industry. I include industry-year fixed effects and country-year fixed effects. The standard errors in parenthesis are clustered by country and industry. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1% level.
(1) The indicator of economic freedom is the Fraser Index. The set of labour market regulations consists of the strictness of employment protection, the existence of a minimum wage, and the expenditure on labour market programmes as a share of GDP. Trade openness, inflation and government consumption as a share of GDP capture the effect of macro-reforms. The ratio of private credit by deposit money banks to GDP and the value added share of finance in total value added are measures of financial sector size. Industry size is the employment share of an industry. I include industry-year fixed effects and country-year fixed effects. The standard errors in parenthesis are clustered by country and industry. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1% level.
(1) HUN, IRL, JPN) . The dependent variables are the contribution of labour productivity, TFP and the knowledge economy to value added growth, and the growth rates of value added per hour worked and value added. R&D-intensity and external finance dependence are industry characteristics which are interacted with the financial liberalization index for a country and year (Liberalization). Industry size is the employment share of an industry. I include industry-year fixed effects and country-year fixed effects. The standard errors in parenthesis are clustered by country and industry. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1% level.
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